‘The TUC Principles: Competitive nightmare or realistic regulation of the market?’

The CCP seminar series continues on Friday 27th March with the marvellously charismatic Shaun Bradshaw (CCP & LAW) presenting his latest paper on a very novel topic, ‘The TUC Principles: Competitive nightmare or realistic regulation of the market?‘. Shaun is a PhD Researcher and Associate Tutor at the UEA Law School, having joined the CCP in October 2014. His research interests encompass numerous legal topics, including Labour Law, Competition Law, EU Law and Human Rights. An abstract for his paper can be viewed below.

Although clearly stated as being legally unenforceable, the Trade Union Congress’s Disputes Principles and Procedures have serious anti-competitive effects. Principles 2 and 3 severely restrict a TUC affiliate’s ability to compete. Affiliates cannot freely recruit and/or organise where another TUC affiliate is already present. This paper aims to analyse the TUC’s Dispute Principles from a Competition policy viewpoint. The paper will achieve this aim through the evaluation and analysis of the TUC’s Dispute Principles in light of competition policy and an exploration of the potential effects of full competition on collective bargaining. The paper will also use the UK law on the prohibition on individual detriment for action short of dismissal to provide an explanation for the TUC Principles.

The seminar will be held from 13:00-14:00 in the Thomas Paine Study Centre (TPSC), Room 1.03.

This is the final CCP seminar before the Easter break. We will return after Easter with more excellent seminars and further news of our Annual Conference in June.

‘A Comparison of Wholesale and Agency Structures in Differentiated Markets’

The CCP Seminar Series continues on Friday 13th March with the marvellously talented Liang Lu (CCP & ECO) presenting her research entitled ‘A Comparison of Wholesale and Agency Structures in Differentiated Markets‘. Liang joined the UEA School of Economics in October 2012 to undertake a PhD on the topic of ‘High-street and Luxury Collaborations’. Her research interests include Industrial Organization and Consumer Behaviour. An abstract for Liang’s presentation can be found below.


We compare the wholesale and agency structures characterizing a supply and distribution chain in a bilateral duopoly model with differentiation. Overall mark-up is lower and demand is higher under the agency structure of supplier pricing and retailer revenue sharing. We examine firms’ preferences: suppliers gain from the wholesale structure whereas retailers are better off under the agency structure as long as the level of supplier differentiation is not too low. That is, while high levels of differentiation at one layer of the market generally benefit firms at that layer and harm firms at the other under the wholesale structure, it is not necessarily so under the agency structure.

The seminar takes place from 13:00-14:00 in the Thomas Paine Study Centre, Room 1.03.