‘Crude oil price differentials, product heterogeneity and institutional arrangements’

The CCP seminar series continues on Friday 31st October with a distinguished guest from Columbia, Jesús Otero (Universidad del Rosario), presenting his paper on ‘Crude oil price differentials, product heterogeneity and institutional arrangements‘. Jesús completed his PhD at the University of Warwick in 1998 and has been at Professor of Economics at Universidad del Rosario since 2003.  An abstract for his paper can be found below.


We adopt time-series and cross-section methods to analyse long-term relationships between pairs of crude oil prices and assess how physical and institutional factors affect their speed of reaction to exogenous shocks. Using a methodological approach which does not require identifying specific crudes as benchmarks, we shows that the overwhelming majority of prices have stable long term relationships. We also find that crudes with physical similarity converge quickly after a shock, while prices for oil produced in OPEC countries are relatively slow to revert to equilibrium after a shock.

The seminar will take place from 13:00-14:00 in the Thomas Paine Study Centre, Room 1.03.

‘Competition Law as Transnational Law’

The CCP seminar series continues on Friday 24th October with the marvellous Imelda Maher (University College Dublin) presenting her paper entitled ‘Competition Law as Transnational Law‘. Imelda is a prolific author in the fields of EU Law and Competition Policy and, in 2006, was inaugurated to the Sutherland Chair of European Law at UCD.  An abstract for her paper can be found below.


The aim of this paper is to being to explore trends in competition law.  In this preliminary phase of the project, I am taking two ideas: transnational law and territoriality – and reflecting on them in the context of competition law.  I have chosen these two concepts as, in my mind at least, they are closely inter-related in this particular field.  The reason for this conceptual inter-linkage is a practical phenomenon which is that despite the undoubted globalisation of trade and the ongoing growth of multinational firms, competition law – the key legal mechanism to ensure that markets operate as freely as possible to ensure consumer and hence general welfare – is strictly territorial in nature.  National Competition Agencies – even the most powerful ones like the US Department of Justice and the EU Commission, have limited capacity to enforce their own laws extraterritorially even though so much of the market activity that in particular the Commission looks at is transnational in nature.  So, I suppose the title to some extent recognises that competition law is territoriality bounded in nature and yet strives to be or maybe perhaps should be (but is most unlikely to be) transnational in scope.

This preliminary paper is divided into four sections:  first, I will outline what I mean by transnational law.  Then I will explore the extent to which competition law is territoriality bounded (drawing on a recently published paper in Handl, Zekoll and Zumbansen, Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (2012)).  The third section is a first attempt to bring these two ideas together and reflect on how competition law moves beyond its territoriality before concluding.

The seminar will take place from 13:00-14:00 in the Thomas Paine Study Centre, Room 1.03.

‘Private Meta-Regulation’

We’re delighted to welcome Colin Scott (University College Dublin) to the university today (Friday 24th October). Colin will be attending the UEA Law School Seminar Series, where he will presenting his paper on ‘Private Meta-Regulation‘ which he has co-authored with Fabrizio Cafaggi (SNA and EUI). An abstract for their paper can be found below and further information on the project (including policy briefs and case studies) can be found at the website for the Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law.


Meta-regulation, the steering or regulation of self-regulation, is increasingly recognised to be an important part of state capacity to harness private regulatory capacity and to govern indirectly. New research on transnational private regulation suggests that the potential of meta-regulation is not limited to the pursuit by the state of the public interest objectives which it defines. Rather we see the emergence of meta-regulatory regimes in which the state is not a significant actor, and within which the mechanisms for asserting meta-regulation are not the hierarchical capacity of the state to impose, but rather the social and market mechanisms associated with other modes of ordering. The reasons for the emergence of such private meta-regulation are explored. These include the need to respond to fragmented regulation, market and social pressures to demonstrate enhanced legitimacy and effectiveness of private regulation, and a wish to address the consequences of competition between regulatory regimes.

In this paper we analyse the modes through which meta-regulation is established, in some instances through membership organisations, using contractual methods, but in other instances without a basis in membership and contract. Related to this we look at how, in the absence of state involvement, meta-regulatory requirements are made binding and how this affects the variety of instruments deployed in particular sectors.  Thus the paper supplements the idea that state capacity is central to meta-regulation showing that there are social and competitive reasons underpinning the establishment of non-state meta-regulatory regimes and offering an analysis of the conditions underpinning the emergence of such regimes and their prospects for success.

The paper raises further questions for discussion. These include an exploration of the mechanisms through which legitimacy and effectiveness of such private meta-regulatory regimes is assured and whether some standard template might be developed to permit meta-regulators to demonstrate compliance with certain basic principles. It also raises the question whether governmental or inter-governmental bodies might have a role in steering of meta-regulation, as appears to have happened in the case of advertising in the EU (meta-meta-regulation).


The seminar will take place from 10:00-11:00 in Earlham Hall, Room 1.07.

‘Anticompetitive Injunctions in Competition Law’

It’s back to the future for this week’s CCP seminar as we welcome the return of CCP alumna Sebastian Peyer (University of Leicester). Seb completed his PhD at the UEA Law School in 2010 and also worked as a Post Doctorate Research Fellow at the CCP. Seb will be presenting one of his latest research topics, ‘Anticompetitive Injunctions in Competition Law‘. An abstract for his presentation can be found below.


Claimants frequently use injunctions to enforce competition law in the courts of the Member States. Injunctions force the defendant to do or stop doing something, and they are powerful tools in the hands of claimants that seek access to infrastructure, wish to be supplied with a particular input or feel unfairly treated. This raises the question whether injunctions based on competition law can be used to achieve anticompetitive outcomes. In this paper, I will describe potential strategies and factors that can be used to identify anticompetitive injunction claims. These factors are used to analyse antitrust litigation in Germany and England. I will demonstrate that in some instances injunction claims have a higher risk of leading to anticompetitive outcomes, and I will discuss potential safeguards to filter out potentially anticompetitive injunctions.

The seminar will take place on Friday 17th October from 13:00-14:00 in the Thomas Paine Study Centre, Room 1.03.