NIE Conference Papers (I)

Last Friday CCP hosted the 2012 NIE winter conference. We’d like to share some of the papers with you.

Kathleen Nosal, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics presented “Estimating switching costs for Medicare advantage plans”

Gautam Gowrisankaran, University Arizona, Department of Economics discussed “Mergers when prices are negotiated: Evidence from the hospital industry”

We will hopefully have some photos to show you in the New Year.

Private Enforcement of predation cases

From the Autumn 2012 Research Bulletin, by Morten Hviid, Professor in Law

With the number of private actions for amages increasing in the UK, we offer a word of caution about cases alleging predation. The article highlights possible misuse of such cases and explains the importance of establishing that the victim is at least an as-efficient firm as the predator. Read more of this post

Evaluation of policy: the task of quantifying the unknowns: deterrence and non-detection

From the Autumn 2012 Research Bulletin, by Stephen Davies, Professor of Economics and Peter Ormosi, Lecturer in Competition Policy

For all the considerable recent advances in techniques used to evaluate the impact of competition policy, we still know remarkably little about two major unknowns: how much anti-competitive harm is avoided because it is deterred, and how much harm is there out there of which we are blissfully unaware, because it is undetected? This article discusses some of the very real problems, revolving around selection bias, in our own current research designed to quantify these unknowns. Read more of this post

Retail Energy Markets: Does Competition offer enough Protection?

From the Autumn 2012 Research Bulletin, by Catherine Waddams, Professor in Regulation

This article examines some of the issues facing the UK energy regulator as it attempts both to promote competition and ensure that vulnerable households are not disadvantaged in the process. Some of the remedies introduced after the 2008 Energy Supply Probe, including the non discrimination clauses, have proved to be less effective than hoped, and in some cases to have been counterproductive and to have slowed the competitive process. Both regulator and government have to choose in this highly sensitive household energy sector whether to focus on the competitive process, which is likely to lower average prices and encourage innovation, but cannot guarantee particular outcomes for given consumers; or on regulation which can protect vulnerable groups, but probably at the expense of higher prices for consumers as a whole. Read more of this post